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ABSTRACT We investigated whether and how political misinformation is engineered using a dataset
of four months worth of tweets related to the 2016 presidential election in the United States. The data
contained tweets that achieved a significant level of exposure and was manually labelled into misinformation
and regular information. We found that misinformation was produced by accounts that exhibit different
characteristics and behaviour from regular accounts. Moreover, the content of misinformation is more novel,
polarised and appears to change through coordination. Our findings suggest that engineering of political
misinformation seems to exploit human traits such as reciprocity and confirmation bias. We argue that
investigating howmisinformation is created is essential to understand human biases, diffusion and ultimately
better produce public policy.
INDEX TERMS Misinformation, data science, US elections, politics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even if the term fake news reached the mainstream in
the 2016 electoral campaign in the United States, this
phenomenon —and mainly, worries about how agents
might strategically act to influence people’s beliefs and
perceptions— appears every time a new technological break-
through in communications emerges [2], [33]. For instance,
the introduction of cheap printing presses and advertis-
ing business models allowed newspapers to increase their
reach dramatically [24]. Partisans, ideologues and some
ill-intentioned ‘entrepreneurs’ were among the beneficiaries
that, by adopting such innovations and strategically promot-
ing sensational stories, managed to increase sales.
In later years, the appearance of innovations such as the
radio, TV and the internet, have unintentionally incentivised
similar behaviours. The unintended effects of these technolo-
gies have been so significant that each of them has brought
regulation aimed at avoiding deception and minimising the
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Wenge Rong.
influence on public opinion. For example, radio and TV
brought with them regulations on deceptive advertising and
political campaigning in the United States [45] and just
recently, the so-called fake news campaigns in social media
have sparked discussions about reining fake news in countries
like France [16] and the United Kingdom [43].
The recent explosion in usage of social networking sites
to obtain pecuniary gains from sensationalist stories [2] or
strategically influence political campaigns [5], [20], [38] has
highlighted the need to better comprehend how misinforma-
tion is created, how it diffuses in social media [46] and how
it can be spotted [14], [31], [36], [48]. Most efforts to under-
stand the phenomena [1], [2], [6]–[8], [15], [32]–[34], [42],
and develop solutions [11], [14], [31], [48] suggest human
biases may foster the diffusion of misinformation. How-
ever, and despite having identified perverse incentives in
the diffusion of information in other forms of electronic
media, little attention has been paid to how misinformation
is generated and seeded into online social networks. In this
paper, we aim at closing this bridge by providing evidence
of the engineering process behind political misinformation
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and suggesting explanations into why such engineering may
work. We argue that understanding how misinformation is
created is necessary to explain observed differences in the
diffusion of misinformation,1 better understanding human
biases and generating public policy.
To perform this study, we used a dataset containing tweets
collected during four months just after the 2016 presiden-
tial election in the United States [3]. This dataset includes
manually labelled tweets2 that got re-tweeted more than
1000 times. This dataset was chosen for different reasons.
First, it is now widely accepted that foreign agents strate-
gically acted to influence public opinion [44]. If deceivers
took strategic actions, we would expect to be able to identify
them within this dataset. Second, [46] points out that tweets
containing true information usually never diffused to more
than a 1000 people. By using tweets that got retweeted at
least 1000 times, we can single-out characteristics of tweets
containing misinformation, given the tweet achieved a sub-
stantial level of diffusion. Also, such tweets may be most
relevant from the public policy perspective (i.e. it is highly
unlikely that policy-makers are both interested and capable
in regulating misinformation that does not alter the general
public opinion). Finally, the sets of annotations used within
the dataset encompass deceptive information, rumours, sub-
jective information and false information within the label
of misinformation. The variety of annotations allowed us
to extend and corroborate findings of research done in the
context of false information only.
In summary, we begin by assuming individuals participate
in social media to achieve a specific goal.3 In the case of
political misinformation, such goals may include pecuniary
gains or influencing public opinion [2] though, in this work,
we abstract away from the goal deceivers may pursue, and
look to confirm the following:
Deceivers strategically engineer their social media
posts.
Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we will put forward
evidence confirming this claim by showing that tweets con-
taining misinformation, and the accounts spreading them,
have significantly different features compared to those not
containing them.
We present three sets of results. The first set shows differ-
ences between features of accounts spreadingmisinformation
and other types of accounts. We find that, on average, the for-
mer has fewer followers but followmore other accounts, have
fewer status updates and were created more recently, and
tend to favourite more the content of the others. In this way,
we show that accounts sharing misinformation significantly
differ from others and suggest this behaviour appears to be
intentionally designed to elicit reciprocity. The second set
1In a comprehensive study, [46] find that falsehood travels faster, deeper
and more broadly than truth; and, in particular, false news related to politics,
travel faster and deeper than those related to other topics.
2Tweets were labelled following the categories established by Conroy
et al. [12]
3A survey detailing political participation online can be found in [35]
of results presents differences within the textual field of
the tweet. We show statistical differences in syntactic style;
i.e., misinformation usually contains more exclamations,
capitalisation and digits. Furthermore, we present sentiment
analysis showing differences in the usage of sentiment both,
through time and in general. We argue that such differences
in sentiment are intentional and aimed at exploiting human
psychological biases. Finally, we support this assertion (i.e.,
that textual features are engineered to exploit psychological
biases) by showing that tweets containing misinformation
were more favourited than those containing regular
information.
Together, our results seem to confirm that the engineering
of tweets bolstered the diffusion of political misinformation
within the 2016 presidential election in the United States and
that such engineering was geared to exploit human biases.
As such, we suggest such engineering might be one of
the causes political misinformation spreads faster and more
broadly than other types of misinformation. Nevertheless,
even if our results coincide with the more extensive study
done by [46], we acknowledge the limitations our data may
impose on our claim. Therefore, our main contribution is to
underscore the need to study how such misinformation is
generated. Realising that the effects of misinformation cannot
be explained by human biases alone allows us to understand
such biases, differences in diffusion processes better, and,
ultimately, generate public policy.
Particularly, our study is related to the literature on
deception and misinformation in social science
[1], [2], [6]–[8], [15], [32]–[34], [42] and automatic deception
detection. To the former, we build from the findings suggest-
ing deceivers may want to strategically act to convey their
information [11], [14], [31], [48]. Our main contribution to
this literature is to extend the finding of strategic action to
conveymisinformation at the individual level to the collective
level. This finding complements research and evidence on
influence campaigns using bots and foreign agents by sug-
gesting their behaviour should be studied systematically [21].
The following section describes methods and data, and
Section III presents the results of our experiments, with a
discussion on them following. The work concludes by sum-
marising the main findings and presenting future lines of
work.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
Our goal is validating the commonly-assumed hypothesis that
misinformation is carefully crafted and engineered by their
authors. In particular, we are interested in identifying some of
the means by which that engineering process took place, and
as such, those features that are significantly different from
usual patterns.
A. DATA
We rely on an annotated dataset that we published previ-
ously [3], indicating whether a tweet contains a piece of mis-
information or not. To the best of our knowledge, this was still
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the only publicly available labelled dataset about misinfor-
mation on Twitter (in contrast to others containing stories or
news sources) at the time of writing these lines. This dataset
enabled us to perform analyses looking for statistically sig-
nificant differences in the features between tweets containing
misinformation and regular information that reached more
than 1000 retweets during the collection window. Though
we acknowledge that this binary labelling has arguably its
limitations, for our particular piece of research, the benefits of
having a simpler and straightforward categorisation outper-
forms the drawbacks. Netflix recently took a similar approach
with regards to its recommender [18].
For completeness, the rest of this subsection will briefly
describe the dataset and its creation process. The dataset was
compiled by collecting publicly available tweets related to
the presidential election in the United States in 2016 using
Twitter’s public streaming API. For each tweet collected,
Twitter’s API provided several features (besides the tweet
text), including the number of retweets, favourites, media,
and URLs. We collected the tweets following Twitter’s API
terms and conditions.
There is nowadays a hot debate on ethical issues around
collection, analysis and publication of social media data, with
no consensus on what constitute good practice regarding its
two main ethical issues: informed consent and minimization
of harm [47]. For this research, we have aligned ourselves
with the common practice in academia of assuming that
users provide informed consent (for their tweets to be col-
lected and analysed) by their acceptance of Twitter’s terms
of service. We can also confirm that, in an effort to min-
imize harm on individual users, we have not enriched the
dataset with external sensitive data on the users, nor have
we applied any algorithm to derive sensitive data. We did not
pre-process the dataset to highlight particular tweets or users.
What is more, in this paper we only refer to summarized
results (i.e. we are not analysing/publishing any individual
tweets).
An essential feature within Twitter is the ability to
share someone’s tweet through ‘retweets’. This functionality
enables users to pass forward to their followers an exact copy
of someone else’s tweet. There are many reasons why users
might decide to retweet; e.g. to spread information to new
audiences, to show one’s role as a listener, or to agree with or
validate someone else’s point of view [9].
The sample (57,379,672 tweets ranging from Novem-
ber 2016 until March 2017) was collected using the fol-
lowing search terms and user handles: #MyVote2016,
#ElectionDay, #electionnight, @realDonald
Trump and @HillaryClinton. This number includes
original tweets and retweets. From them, only the tweets that
have more than 1000 retweets were extracted, resulting in a
total of 9001 tweets. It is relevant to note that a portion of
those tweets is no longer publicly available through Twitter
API: several authors have deleted tweets and some accounts
have been closed for infringing Twitter’s policy, resulting in
tweets no longer being available.
TABLE 1. Agreement between the labelling performed by the two teams
in the used dataset.
Should any researcher be interested in replicating the
results we describe here, the dataset we used for our exper-
imentation (a snapshot at the time of collection) is publicly
available [3]. However, we encourage them to re-query Twit-
ter’s API with the tweets’ IDs listed in the dataset in order
to obtain an updated snapshot of the dataset. Due to deleted
tweets not being returned, results are likely to slightly vary
from those reported here.
Two teams of individuals labelled the tweets in the dataset
(by manually inspecting the text field) as misinformation
if its text could be considered within any of the categories
described in [37], and as a regular tweet (i.e. tweet not con-
taining misinformation) otherwise. The first team was com-
posed of 6 individuals that self-reported little knowledge on
US politics, while the second manually crosschecked every
tweet with factual data. All individuals were over 18 and
received no compensation.
We compared the annotations of the two teams and found
out that they disagree on roughly a quarter of the tweets
(see Table 1). A close inspection to those by a third team
consistently found that annotations by the second team were
to be considered more accurate. To ensure the highest pos-
sible standard, for the present study, we focus solely on the
labelling of the second team. This data contains 1675 tweets
(that were retweeted more than 1000 times) labelled as mis-
information —18.6% of the 9001 in the dataset— and left
aside their 381 unknowns (4.23%). After reviewing the study,
Imperial College London considered it was exempt from
further ethical review.
B. METHODOLOGY
We looked for statistically significant differences in the distri-
butions of features through a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [27]
between the set of tweets that achieved 1000 retweets or
more and contain misinformation, and those that achieved
1000 retweets or more and contain regular information.
The null hypothesis was h0: The two samples come from
the same distribution against the alternative hypothesis
h1: The two samples come from different distributions.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is particularly suited in this situ-
ation as it allows us to compare whether or not two samples
come from the same arbitrary (i.e. not assuming normality)
probability distribution.
We consider that a difference between sets is statistically
significant if the p-value is lower than 1%. For the con-
tinuous variables with extreme values, we did the test on
the (decimal) logarithm in order to have a more represen-
tative scale. For others (e.g. num_hashtags, num_mentions,
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num_media, num_urls), we compute the number of items per
tweet. p-values smaller than 1e-16 are reported in all tables
as 0.00.
Implementation-wise, we used R (v3.4) and Python 3 as
programming languages, and the eTRIKS Analytical Envi-
ronment (eAE) [30] as the analytical platform. The eAE
is a flexible multi-tenant computational framework which
enables the analysis of data at scale, enabling researchers to
explore and analyse data concurrently and in the language of
their choice.
III. RESULTS
In order to provide a comprehensive study on all relevant
aspects related to crafting and engineering of misinformation,
we studied several features of the tweets from three different
angles: 1) information about the account, 2) analysis of the
text of the tweet and 3) information about the tweet.
The primary source of data features was Twitter’s API.
From it, we obtained some of them and derived many others.
The rest of this section focuses on checking whether or not
the value distributions of the features of the tweets differ
when referred to misinformation or not. We assume that those
differences are due to a conscious engineering process. To do
so, we compute statistically significant differences in their
value distributions. Results of this analysis are shown both
numerically and visually.
A. FEATURES OF THE ACCOUNT
Literature [39] has shown that particular accounts are more
prone to generate misinformation. The US government has
recently disclosed a list of Twitter accounts that were known
to spread misinformation consistently [19].
Under this umbrella, we have studied features about the
account (such as its number of followers, whether or not
it is verified, whether it has an image in its profile, etc.)
and features about the syntactical analysis of the name and
description of the account. Results are shown respectively
in Tables 2 and 3. Following ethical guidelines, note that we
did not derive any sensitive data.
When contrasting accounts spreading misinformation to
others, results in Table 2 show that the former has fewer
followers but follow more other accounts, have more infre-
quent status updates and were created more recently, and
tend to favourite more the content of others. Results reported
in Table 3 lead us to conclude that individuals with higher
numbers of special characters and capitals in their user
name are more likely to tweet misinformation. These results
are consistent with the observation that these accounts
are short-lived and created programmatically, and therefore
aimed to avoid name collision with existing ones.
However, it should be noted that a statistically significant
difference does not mean that such a difference is substan-
tial or ultimately meaningful. So, in order to better assess
meaningful differences, we are also plotting the density dis-
tributions. Fig 1 visually displays the density distributions of
TABLE 2. Analysis of features related to the account generating
the tweet. The results (p-value and t-stat) come from the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [27] on the distributions between the
misinformation and the other tweets. Rows are ordered by p-value.
Variables above the line are those whose differences are considered
statistically significant (p-value smaller than 0.01).
TABLE 3. Features about the account generating the tweet (related
to text analysis). Again, rows are ordered by statistical significance;
significant variables are above the line. It is interesting to see that those
are mostly the ones associated with spelling used by bots (randomly
generated to avoid collisions).
FIGURE 1. Density distribution of the variables from Table 2 that are
statistically significant. The test for the proportion of verified account
confirms an expected fact: the proportion of verified account is much
weaker for tweets containing misinformation than for other tweets,
suggesting that misinformation tends to be created by more ‘anonymous’
people.
the features that do have statistically significant differences
in their distributions.
B. FEATURES OF THE TEXT OF THE TWEET
A second angle to examine misinformation is by looking
at the text within the tweet and analysing, both, its formal
components (syntax), and its meaning (sentiment).
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TABLE 4. Features about the text of tweets. Again, rows are ordered by
statistical significance; significant variables are above the line.
FIGURE 2. Most recurrent words in the tweets (single and bigram).
1) SYNTAX
In this instance, we extracted several textual features (per-
centage of capital letters, digits and special characters) using
regular expressions. We aim to analyse if any of those have
a different probability distribution and thus confirm that an
engineering process has indeed taken place. Table 4 confirms
that a tweet with a high proportion of capital letters, digits and
exclamation marks has more chances to be misinformation.
Along with the textual features, we analysed word fre-
quencies (as single words and bi-grams). The most recurrent
ones are listed in Fig 2 together with their frequencies; dis-
crepancies between distributions are visible. However, it is
important to note that the actual list of words and values are
closely related to the underlying data and context.
2) SENTIMENT ANALYSIS OF THE TWEET TEXT
Finally, we performed sentiment analysis on the content of
the tweets. Sentiment analysis aims at identifying, extract-
ing, quantifying and studying affective states and subjective
information. Often, sentiment analysis is used to determine
the attitude of a speaker [41]; in our case, the author of a tweet.
When human readers approach a text, they use their under-
standing of the emotional intent of words to infer whether
a section of text is positive, negative or neutral, or perhaps
characterised by some more nuanced emotion like surprise
or disgust. Text mining tools are available to extract the emo-
tional content of text programmatically [40], and they usually
boil down to two main approaches [25]: lexical approach and
machine learning approach.
Our first step was to analyse the sentiments of the whole
text field —including hashtags— of tweets in our dataset
using the National Research Council Canada (NRC) lexi-
con [29]. The NRC lexicon provides a dictionary that scores
every word within the lexicon according to their emotional
traits. With the NRC lexicon, we counted the scores associ-
ated to each emotion for each word within each tweet and
aggregated such scores to provide a proxy for the emotions
reflected within each tweet. Finally, we aggregated the counts
for all of the emotions overall and through time. Fig 3 points
FIGURE 3. Comparison between the different core sentiments between
tweets containing misinformation (top) and other tweets (bottom),
following the Lexicon approach. Particularly relevant are the bars related
with negative and positive sentiments, as they show that misinformation
tends to have a less positive sentiment. It can also be observed that most
of the overall contribution to positiveness comes from ‘trust’.
FIGURE 4. Evolution of the different core sentiments (with the Lexicon
approach) over the course of the four months, between tweets containing
misinformation (top) and other tweets (bottom).
out that misinformation generally exhibits less joy, trust and
positive emotions but more surprise. Looking at the tempo-
ral evolution of the emotions (see Fig 4), we noticed that
fluctuation of emotions is higher tweets with misinformation,
while trust and positive emotions dominated in tweets not
containing misinformation.
A sentiment score can also be computed using Deep
Learning techniques [49] and sometimes perform better than
the lexicon approach. The reason for this is that Deep
Learning Techniques can capture subtleties that the lexi-
con approach cannot. In our case, we trained a model to
classify tweets as being positive or negative using the sen-
timent140 dataset (firstly described in [17]). Specifically,
we used two widely-used word embeddings: word2vec from
Google [28] and fasttext from Facebook [23] which were
fed into an LSTM with 128 hidden units followed by a
dense layer using sigmoid activation to calculate a positive or
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FIGURE 5. Difference of the evolution of the sentiment computed by a
network using fasttext embeddings between tweets containing
misinformation and other tweets. Each point represents a tweet in the
timeline of our dataset and the probability of the tweet for being positive.
The red line represents the mean of sentiment for misinformation
whereas the purple line represents the mean for other types of
information.
FIGURE 6. Similar to Fig 5 but adjusted only until the day of the election.
negative sentiment. We chose embeddings of size 300,
the network was trained using RMSprop for 50 epochs and
hyperparameters were tuned using the development set.
Fig 5 shows the overall probability of a tweet being posi-
tive using the fasttext embedding and the network described
before. The average probability over the four whole months
is more positive than negative, regardless of it being mis-
information or not. However, the trend for misinformation
is lower than for the other tweets, which is coherent with
previous results stating that tweets containingmisinformation
tend to be more negative (Fig 3 and 4). The wider spread
is explained by the scarcity of the misinformation at some
periods (and also due to the dataset being imbalanced) and
does not constitute a significant indicator.
C. FEATURES OF A TWEET
By feature of a tweet we refer specifically to the numbers
of 1) hashtags, 2) mentions, 3) URLs, and 4) media elements
in the text of the tweet; and to numbers of 1) retweets and
2) favourites achieved by the tweet the last time seen in the
dataset. Table 5 lists all these features (a detailed description
of each one can be found at Twitter’s API website) together
with the results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. There
are four variables in which the differences in distributions are
different in terms of statistical significance (those above the
horizontal line).
TABLE 5. Analysis of features related to the tweet. The results
(p-value and t-stat) come from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [27]
on the distributions between misinformation and the other tweets.
Rows are ordered by p-value. Variables above the line are those whose
differences are considered statistically significant (p-value smaller
than 0.01).
FIGURE 7. Distributions of the four significant variables related with the
tweets (see Table 5). We can observe that tweets with misinformation
have generally more hashtags and media but less mentions.
In addition to the features listed in Table 5, we looked at the
distribution of tweet sources (iPhone, Android, web client,
media studio, etc.) for both tweets containing misinformation
and those not containing them, and both distributions were
very similar: 40% vs 42% for iPhone, 33% vs 32% for the
web client and 10% vs 9.5% for Android. Those marginal
differences confirm there is no significant difference for this
specific feature and do not offer any other meaningful insight.
Finally, we also analysed the most used hashtags in both
subsets of tweets (leaving aside the ones used for collection),
and we found that there is no statistical difference either
between hashtags used in tweets containing misinformation
and tweets not containing them. Fig 8 shows their frequency
distribution. It is interesting to see that a couple of hashtags
only appear in tweets labelled as misinformation. While this
might be a product of the dataset, it is an issue that probably
deserves further research. However, once again, the frequency
of particular hashtags is hardly generalizable or usable on
another dataset.
1) FEATURES ABOUT DIFFUSION OF TWEETS
As expected, we found out that the retweet count and the
favourite count are correlated (r = 0.665); together with the
number of followers of a user and the number of times she has
been listed (r = 0.911). However, the evolution in the number
of retweets (and favourites) dramatically varies depending
on the tweets. Within our dataset, we can find examples for
linear, exponential and polynomial over time.
In order to find out whether or not any of these is prevalent
in misinformation, we computed the time (in hours) it takes
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FIGURE 8. Frequency of appearance of most used hashtags in tweets
containing misinformation (red) and not containing them (blue).
FIGURE 9. Distribution of the decimal logarithm of hours taken to get to
1000 favourites (fav_timeto1000) for both tweets containing
misinformation and others. The associated p-value is 9.60e-11 which
proves the significance of the diffusion pattern.
to get to 10, 20, 50, 100, 250, 500 and 1000 retweets (and to
an equal number of favourites, respectively). Fig 9 shows the
different distributions of the time to get to 1000 favourites
(which is the most distinctive feature of this set) for tweets
containing misinformation and other tweets. Tweets contain-
ing misinformation are generally slower to get a thousand
favourites.
Finally, we also enriched the original dataset by computing
the day and the hours at which the tweet was published (in
the EST referential). The number of days which separates the
creation of a tweet and the creation of its Twitter account is,
on average, 1941 days for tweets containing misinformation
and 2100 days for other tweets. This delta represents a com-
puted p-value of 1.04e-08 which is indeed highly significant.
This result suggests that accounts spreading misinformation
were created more recently (already observed in [46]). This
result is coherent with the fact that users who spreadmisinfor-
mation have their accounts eventually deleted and are forced
to create new ones.
IV. DISCUSSION
Results presented in the sections above are intended to high-
light differences in sources (accounts from which tweets
are coming) and style (how textual elements of the tweets
are crafted) between tweets containing misinformation and
regular information. Our analysis shows that accounts sharing
misinformation were created more recently, are less likely to
be verified, and have fewer updates than those sharing other
types of information. Also, these accounts tend to use weird
characters in both their screen name and description. More-
over, accounts sharing misinformation have fewer followers
but tend to follow others more often, and are more likely to
favourite the content of others.
Such characteristics suggest that accounts sharing mis-
information not only have a different profile from those
sharing other types of information,4 but also exhibit dif-
ferent behaviours such as following others and favouriting
their content more often. Particularly interesting to our aim
is to identify the before-mentioned behavioural differences.
Research into reciprocity in online social communities [10],
[13] has found that ‘creating directed links to other nodes
drive the latter to correspond by creating a link to the for-
mer’. This behaviour, known as altruistic reciprocity, has
been widely confirmed across online social platforms [13].
We hypothesise accounts sharing misinformation may follow
this behaviour as reciprocity may make it more likely to
increase the visibility of their content.
Turning to stylistic differences, research in the field of
automatic deception detection suggests syntactic differences
could single-out deception. Reference [14] explains deceivers
usually carefully craft their messages, but that syntactic leak-
ages are, both, inevitable and detectable. Our results show
such differences were present not only in the textual fields
of tweets but also in screen name and descriptions of the
accounts (Table 3). About the tone of the message, research
into Bayesian decision theory [4], [22] has shown elements of
novelty attract human attention because new information is
central to update our understanding of the world. Fig 3 shows
that our proxy for novelty (surprise) is overall more prevalent
in misinformation than in regular information. Because this
feature may be a product of the nature of misinformation
and, hence, not engineered, we turned to analyse sentiment
throughout the temporal dimension of our sample. From
Fig 4, two facts stand out. First, if misinformation were
novel by nature, it would be expected that the sentiment of
surprise would be generally higher when compared to regular
information. We found the mean sentiment of surprise for
misinformation and other types of information to be 0.11 and
0.09 respectively. Second, there is a large amount of vari-
ation in sentiments for misinformation but not for regular
information. Such a finding is puzzling as it lends itself
to considerable speculation (e.g., are these drastic changes
contradictory and, hence, the source of novelty? are these
changes intentional? or are they part of the nature of misinfor-
mation?). Even if these findings are not helpful to settle the
issue, it is easy to see that, both, the domain and variability
4Upon detailed inspection, it is, perhaps, no coincidence that profile is
shared with that identified by [19], [26] as accounts dedicated to sharing
misinformation during the 2016 election in the United States.
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of the different emotions computed seem to be larger for
misinformation. This variation may suggest, however, that
misinformation may be dynamically changing to create
polarisation.
As related by [42], political polarisation in the form of
partisanship profoundly affects the way individuals pro-
cess information in the presence of new evidence. Highly
polarised information is more likely to be rationalised by
individuals if they agree with such information. This effect
is called confirmation bias. To test for the possibility such
information may be engineered, we computed its sentiment.
One would expect the slope of both curves in Fig 6 to be
close to zero if the textual features of such tweets are not
engineered.Wewould expect this because such a slope would
be the product of a lack of coordination. However, what we
see is that the slope for the fit of misinformation is positive.
It could be argued that such coordination was the product of
the election of Donald Trump. However, even after eliminat-
ing all the data just after November 9th 2016, such trend is
still visible (see Fig 6).
Systematic differences in the source of misinformation,
behaviours and features that are likely to increase the impact
of misinformation, together with evidence pointing to contin-
uous, seemingly coordinated, changes in tone of the textual
elements of the tweets appear to point towards an effort to
engineering political misinformation. The media have widely
covered such an effort. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, our results are amongst the first efforts to shed light
on the systematic way political misinformation was engi-
neered. Furthermore, we have suggested such efforts are
tailored to exploit known human biases such as confirmation
bias or other effects such as that of altruistic reciprocity.
Our analysis confirms a higher proportion of favourites for
misinformation.
One might argue that bots drive this result. However [46]
showed that the proportion of bots used by accounts spreading
true information was the same to that of those spreading false
information. Given that our dataset should be a random subset
of theirs, we would expect such proportion to be maintained.
The evidence presented so far raises the possibility that,
at least within the context of our data, careful engineering
of misinformation could be a driver for diffusion. Behaviours
such as the above -average level of following and favouriting
and the amounts of polarisation and novelty in the textual
field of the message seem to exploit human biases. Together
with the fact that the latter appears to be a product of coordina-
tion suggest these actions may help political misinformation
diffuse faster and broader than other types of information. It is
important to stress that most of our results match those of
[46], which makes it possible that our results may translate
into more general contexts.
We acknowledge that our study is limited by the data, both
by its size and scope, and the hardness of having an accu-
rate and unbiased labelling (as Table 1 illustrates). It seems
clear that different cultural backgrounds, knowledge of the
American culture, and English language proficiency induced
vastly different perceptions on whether a piece of information
is considered misinformation or not.
We are currently in the process of performing similar stud-
ies with datasets on different electoral processes that we have
collected in the last year. Until then, the findings reported
here should be taken more like potential leads rather than
established truth.
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